30 years on, the issues plaguing our MRT system

Many may never know that our MRT system is not a subway system. Well, that's the hard truth. It was never meant to be one. In fact, the MRT system is actually a railway system. Well, who knew, right? Nobody did.

Ever since KTMB's withdrawal from Tanjong Pagar Railway Station in 2011, Singapore was only left with one railway system - the MRT. The MRT had its humble beginnings since 1987, operated by MRTC, the present Land Transport Authority. The control of the lines has since been transferred over to SMRT and SBS Transit. SMRT operates the NS,EW and CCL, while SBST operates the NE and DTL.


Fated to be or chose to be?
Well, we all know that our MRT has started to face problems as early as 2011 - 15 Dec 2011, to be exact. That day, the nightmare for Singaporeans, SMRT's employees, then SMRT CEO Saw Phaik Hwa, then Minister for Transport Lui Tuck Yew, present ambassador of Singapore to Japan.

What happened that eventful day?
The short answer: A train breakdown
The long answer: A mega-scale train breakdown. For the first time in 24 years, between 6:50 p.m. to 12:15am, the following day. The disruption had taken place from Bishan (a major NS-CCL interchange) to Marina Bay (then a quiet terminus of the NSL).
Image result for mrt third rail sagging
Credits: Google Images

And the cause is?
It started out with a faulty fastener on one of the many Third Rail Support Assemblies (TRSAs) found on the system, on the Northbound stretch from City Hall (CTH) to Dhoby Ghaut (DBG) stations. This resulted in the third rail to sag by 40mm.

The 40mm sag of the third rail, however, should not cause any major problems. This is due to the train's Current Collector Device(CCD) to be spring fitted. This allows the CCD to withstand sagging of third rail as much as 65mm. This additional 25mm allowance had allowed the TRSAs to be more vulnerable to vibrations.

Unfortunately, the adjacent TRSAs had also malfunctioned. With additional vibrations overtime, the TRSAs continued to fail gradually, and when the third rail had finally sagged to the 65mm mark,  the CCD is subjected to abnormal force. This is because the third rail never sags, until that very day. It is believed that after the incident occurred, more than one train had passed the incident power rail, which later led to the 17th Dec incident (stated later in this post). This failure was not easily detectable then due to the lack of technology.

In the evening of 15 Dec, a train, operating as TRN 151, had passed the incident site. The CCD shoes on TRN 151 was damaged. The subsequent trains all had their CCD damaged by the sagged third rail. Some trains eventually stalled as they were no longer able to draw sufficient power from the third rail to power its propulsion system. At the incident site, more trains travelled past it, resulting in three more claws to dislodge, ending in a 40m stretch lying on the track bed. This caused the section of tracks impassable to the rest of the trains.

However, investigations by the Committee of Inquiry, following interviews and statements by expert witnesses, has concluded that the sagging of the third rail has been caused by multiple factors, none of which could have caused the sagging individually. The COI also agreed with the expert witnesses that the defects in the system would require time to develop in the fasteners and insulators way before the Dec 15, but were not identified nor remedied by SMRT's maintenance.

During the Dec 15 disruption, ventilation fans and air conditioning was not working. As a result, one passenger had taken the fire extinguisher and smashed the door windows onboard C151 067/068.

Source of photo is unknown at this present moment


And what happened 2 days later on 17 Dec 2017?
A few trains were once again encountered with power supply problems. Four trains were immobilized along both the Northbound and Southbound tracks. The trains were supposedly nicknamed as "rouge trains" following the incident, as they had passed the area before TRN 151 (refer to 15 Dec case), and hence the damage to the CCD was not as extensive as it is to the following trains.

Hence, these trains were deployed on NSL on the 17th. The failed CCD that were not detected before hence reoccurred and the lowered CCD were not able to draw power from the third rail and hence caused the trains to stall, bringing trains to standstill.

And a day later on 18th December
Train service had only began at 11am for the EWL, and almost an hour later for the NSL, at 12:08pm. At that time, checks were conducted throughout the system to ensure that CCDs were working normally and that no third rail along the system were sagging. Originally, the trains were supposed to begin normal service at 10am, but were moved later due to the late completion of the checks.

Lets fast forward by 5 years, to Jan 2017...
So what have we learnt in the past 5 years?

Nothing.

Why?

Let's look back first. What happened on 22 Mar 2016?

Two of SMRT's trackside employees were killed at a trackside accident just 200m short of Pasir Ris. During the accident, safety procedures were not followed, and the train captain was unforgivingly sacked by SMRT, even though he had known nothing about the repair works that was taking place ahead of his track path.

Safety lapses, but hey, let's forgive the team and move on. But is that a thing in the company's culture? Something that has even affected external companies?

I guess yes shall be the correct answer.

But why?

Well, if you remember, 16 April was the first time that CBTC was operating full day. However, the CBTC has ran into a lot of problems. So the cause was attributed to...

The engineers at Thales had forgot to install an important part of the radio comms system, leading to momentarily loss of radio communications, bringing trains to a standstill.

So is this the company which influence external people? We may never know.

But is there hope for our MRT system?

Yes, but...

the recent implementation of the 50 cents discount if you enter the system before 7:45am sorts of is a disadvantage to SMRT.

But why? Some may ask.

The reason: This deprives SMRT of the required revenue to conduct the required servicing to provide the services. SMRT however, had no say over this as LTA owns the rights to make the decision. So... is that good news for us?

Not really, unless you consider the fact that you stand to gain.

Are there any other problems?
Well, we need to have experts in the system to help us but if we don't even have the money to conduct proper servicing for our system, how are we supposed to get experts on this?

In conclusion...
in exchange for better services, Singaporeans expect to pay less for the regular breakdowns. Yet, they never ever think of the need of the money to conduct the repairs.

We never ever think of the needed revenue and only thought of our convenience. I know that that is the point of our MRT system, but if we would rather get (convenience+paying less)>(safety+reliability), then I have no words.

The frontline staff in SMRT has always taken the blame in the faults, but what has the management done? This year, the management only talked once, with regards to the flooding incident.

Is this a culture? Or a habit?

We don't know, but we all know one thing as Singaporeans.

That is that SMRT needs to up it's game and not continue its "culture". It is up to anyone in the management team to do so, as they make the important decisions.

Thus, we shall just wait and see if improvements happen.


This post was posted on the MRT's system 30th anniversary on 7 November 2017, at 4:30am Singapore Time, which the system's electrical system begins to activate.

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